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Evolution Of Co-operation

Election frequency and the emergence of cooperation in a simulated inter-group conflict

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Election frequency and the emergence of cooperation in a simulated inter-group conflict

Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (4), 483-508, 1997.


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Representation methods and the emergence of inter-group cooperation



Representation methods and the emergence of inter-group cooperation


Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. In R. Suleiman, K. G.  Troitzsch, U. Mueller, & N. Gilbert (Eds.),

Tools and techniques for social science simulation (pp. 218-239). Physica Verlag, 2000.


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Simulating cooperation and competition: present state and future objectives

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Simulating cooperation and competition: present state and future objectives


Suleiman R., In K. G. Troitzsch, U. Mueller, & N. Gilbert  (Eds.), Social science microsimulations. (pp. 264-281).  Springer, 1996.


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Social science microsimulations: Tools for modeling, parameter optimization, and sensitivity analysis.


Social science microsimulations: Tools for modeling, parameter optimization, and sensitivity analysis.


Gilbert, N., Mueller, U., Suleiman, R., & Troitzsch, K. (1997) Dagstuhl Seminar Report 177.

Internationales Begegnungs und Forschungszentrum fur Informatik, Schloss Dagstuhl,

Germany.


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The effects of election frequency and delegation methods on cooperation in simulated intergroup conflicts.

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The effects of election frequency and delegation methods on cooperation in simulated intergroup conflicts.


R. Suleiman, I. Fischer, In T. Gärling, G. Backenroth-Ohsako, & B. Ekehammar (Eds.). Diplomacy and psychology: Prevention of armed conflicts after the cold war (pp.142-181).  Marshall Cavendish, 2006


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The emergence of Tit-For-Tat strategies

The emergence of Tit-For-Tat strategies


In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. Messick. (Eds.). Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas.

Cambridge University Press, 2004.


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The Evolution of cooperation in a simulated intergroup conflict

The Evolution of cooperation in a simulated intergroup conflict


Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. In W. B. G. Liebrand, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Frontiers in social dilemma research.

(pp. 419-438). Berlin: Springer, 1996.


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When one decides for many: The effect of delegation methods on cooperation in simulated inter-group conflicts

When one decides for many: The effect of delegation methods on cooperation in simulated inter-group conflicts

 

Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I.  Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. 3 (4),

http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/3/4/1.html, 2000.


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