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Election frequency and the emergence of cooperation in a simulated inter-group conflict Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (4), 483-508, 1997. |
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Representation methods and the emergence of inter-group cooperation Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. In R. Suleiman, K. G. Troitzsch, U. Mueller, & N. Gilbert (Eds.), Tools and techniques for social science simulation (pp. 218-239). Physica Verlag, 2000. Read (pdf) |
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Simulating cooperation and competition: present state and future objectives Suleiman R., In K. G. Troitzsch, U. Mueller, & N. Gilbert (Eds.), Social science microsimulations. (pp. 264-281). Springer, 1996. |
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Social science microsimulations: Tools for modeling, parameter optimization, and sensitivity analysis. Gilbert, N., Mueller, U., Suleiman, R., & Troitzsch, K. (1997) Dagstuhl Seminar Report 177. Internationales Begegnungs und Forschungszentrum fur Informatik, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany. |
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The effects of election frequency and delegation methods on cooperation in simulated intergroup conflicts. R. Suleiman, I. Fischer, In T. Gärling, G. Backenroth-Ohsako, & B. Ekehammar (Eds.). Diplomacy and psychology: Prevention of armed conflicts after the cold war (pp.142-181). Marshall Cavendish, 2006 Read (pdf) |
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The emergence of Tit-For-Tat strategies In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. Messick. (Eds.). Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, 2004. |
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The Evolution of cooperation in a simulated intergroup conflict Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. In W. B. G. Liebrand, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Frontiers in social dilemma research. (pp. 419-438). Berlin: Springer, 1996. Read (pdf) |
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When one decides for many: The effect of delegation methods on cooperation in simulated inter-group conflicts
Suleiman, R. with Fischer, I. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. 3 (4), http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/3/4/1.html, 2000. |