Perception of the Minority's Collective Identity and Voting Behavior: The Case of the Palestinians in Israel

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Perception of the Minority's Collective Identity and Voting Behavior: The Case of the Palestinians in Israel

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ABSTRACT. The author investigated how Palestinian (n = 130) and Jewish (n = 153) Israeli university students perceived the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. The Palestinian and Jewish respondents perceived the “identity space” of the minority as linear, or bipolar, with 1 pole defined by the national (Palestinian) identity and the other defined by the civic (Israeli) label. The Palestinian respondents defined their collective identity in national (Palestinian, Arab) and integrative (Israeli-Palestinian) terms; the Jewish respondents perceived the minority’s identity as integrative (Israeli-Palestinian). Different political outlooks among Palestinian respondents were related to their identification with the civic (Israeli) identity but not to their identification with the national (Palestinian) identity. In contrast, different political outlooks among Jewish respondents were related to their inclusion, or exclusion, of the national (Palestinian) component in their definition of the minority’s identity. Implications of the results are discussed in terms of a minority acculturation model (J. Berry, J. Trimble, & E. Olmedo, 1986).

Key words: acculturation, civic identity, collective identity, Jewish university students, national identity, Palestinian minority in Israel, Palestinian university students, voting behavior

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT of collective identity concerns the active choice through which individuals define their identity by asserting their membership in various social groups. According to the self-categorization hypothesis (Turner, 1985, 1987), the process of self-categorization is the core of social identity. Notwithstanding, Phinney (1990), in her review of research on ethnic identity, noted that, “although ethnic self-identification is an essential starting point in examining ethnic identity, it is not specifically assessed in about half of the studies reviewed” (p. 504).

The focus of the present study was the perception of the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel by Palestinian and Jewish Israelis. It is worth stressing that minority members’ self-categorization (as in the case at hand) poses...
an interesting challenge to Turner's (1985, 1987) self-categorization hypothesis, because minorities are categorized according to ethnic group and according to nationality as indicated by citizenship. The tension between minority members' identification with their ethnic group and their identification with the superordinate group (dominated by the majority) does not necessitate a categorical preference for one of the two identities. According to the acculturation typological perspective, minority members may use one of four acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, dissociation, and marginalization (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Berry, Trimble, & Olmedo, 1986). Consequently, the adopted acculturation mode may affect one's self-categorization. Minority members who adopt an assimilation strategy eventually categorize themselves in a manner that emphasizes their assimilation into mainstream culture (dominated by the majority). An integration strategy results in self-categorization that emphasizes belonging to both the ethnic minority and the mainstream society. A dissociation strategy results in self-categorization that emphasizes membership only in the ethnic minority. A marginalization strategy results in excluding both minority and majority identities from one's self-categorization. In this case, the self may be categorized primarily in terms of other relevant social categories.

Most empirical and theoretical research on the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel lacks sufficient reference to general theories of social identity and intergroup relations. Notwithstanding, several models have been proposed to explain how members of the Palestinian minority integrate their national (Arab or Palestinian) and their civic (Israeli) identities. Most popular are the bipolar model (Tessler, 1977), the orthogonal model (Suleiman & Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Zak, 1976), and the politicization model (Smooha, 1992).

The bipolar model is more popular in the writings of Israeli political scientists and historians who have studied the Palestinian minority (e.g., Landau, 1993; Rekhess, 1990; Rieter, 1988; Tessler, 1977). According to this model, the national and civic identities are contradictory because of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Identification with one side of the conflict necessarily negates identification with the other. Hence, a strengthening of Palestinian identity should cause an increased alienation from the state of Israel. In support of the bipolar model, Tessler found that only 23% of his sample categorized themselves as both Israeli and Palestinian, whereas a significant majority (70%) categorized themselves either as Israeli (29%) or as Palestinian (41%).

The orthogonal model rejects the bipolarity assumption and posits that the Israeli and Palestinian components are orthogonal (or independent), such that synthesis between the two is possible. Using factor analysis, Zak (1976) concluded that the national (Arab) and civic (Israeli) identities constitute two of three orthogonal dimensions (self-esteem was the third) that define the collective identity of the Arabs in Israel. Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi (1997) used a multidimensional scaling method (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) to construct the "identity spaces" of Palestinian university graduates. According to Suleiman and Beit-Hal-
lahmi, the respondents’ identity space was best described as two dimensional, with orthogonal dimensions that could be interpreted as a national–Palestinian dimension and a civic–Israeli dimension.

The politicization (or integration) model (Smooha, 1992) stresses that, together with the “Palestinization” process, the Arabs in Israel are experiencing a parallel process of “Israelization.” According to Smooha (1989), a “new Arab” has evolved in Israel, one who successfully integrates the Palestinian and Israeli components of collective identity. Smooha (1989) found support for his claim in the results of a series of comprehensive surveys on representative samples of the Palestinian minority in Israel. According to data from Smooha’s surveys, only 12% of this minority used “combined-identity” labels (Palestinian–Israeli or Palestinian in Israel) in 1975 to describe their collective identity, whereas the proportion of Palestinians using those labels increased to about 40% in 1987. Smooha interpreted those findings as indicative of a rising integrative orientation in this minority. The new Arabs (Smooha, 1992) (a) are bilingual and bicultural, (b) feel solidarity with the Palestinian people but are loyal to the state of Israel, (c) support the Palestine Liberation Organization and aspire to a two-state solution (Israeli and Palestinian states living side by side), and (d) see their future as associated with the state of Israel.

Identity Attributed to the Minority by the Majority

Most previous researchers have focused on how Palestinian minority members perceive their collective identity but have made no serious effort to investigate how majority members perceive the minority’s collective identity. Doise (1978) emphasized that the ways in which group members perceive an out-group influence their relations with that group. Conversely, existing intergroup relations affect how in-group members perceive the collective identity of the out-group. Minorities perceived by majority members as part of an extended in-group have stronger bargaining power than do minorities perceived as distant out-groups (Clark & Maas, 1988). Mugny and Papastamou (1982) emphasized that keeping a minority outside the social boundaries of the dominant group and perceiving it as an out-group can accentuate differences between the two groups and lead to discrimination against the minority.

Only a few researchers have investigated how members of the Jewish majority perceive the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Smooha (1992) found that only 16% of his Jewish respondents thought that the label Palestinian was appropriate for defining the minority’s collective identity. In contrast, Schnell (1994) reported that 50% of his Jewish respondents defined the Arab citizens of Israel as Palestinians and did not distinguish between them and Palestinians who were not Israeli citizens.

It should be noted that the large difference between the two preceding results may be attributed partly to differences in the measurement methods. Smooha (1992) presented to each respondent a list of identification labels and requested
that he or she decide which label was more appropriate for defining the minority's collective identity. Schnell (1994) used a list of indirect questions to determine whether his respondents distinguished between Palestinians who are Israeli citizens and those who are noncitizens living in the occupied territories.

It is worth stressing that majority members' definition of the minority's collective identity may be influenced by internal variables that are related to the majority's in-group relations. Rabinowitz (1993) noted that the question of the Jews' labeling of the Arabs in Israel should be seen as part and parcel of the ongoing discourse concerning the majority's definition of its own identity. The importance of self-serving variables in majority members' definition of the minority's identity is of particular significance for our case, because both the Israeli and Palestinian components of the minority's collective identity bear considerable political and emotional significance for the Jewish majority.

Collective Identity and Voting Behavior

On the basis of Kelman's (1969) theory of nationalism and civic involvement, Rouhana (1986) proposed a typology of political parties in Israel. From the perspective of the Palestinian minority, the typology maps the various parties in accordance with two types of involvement in the national system: sentimental and instrumental. Rouhana argued that the Israeli political system can serve the Palestinian minority only in achieving instrumental needs. At the sentimental level, the Israeli political system does not offer Palestinians much incentive to perceive it as legitimate, "because its establishment barred the Arab population by definition from inclusion in a Jewish, Zionist identity" (Rouhana, 1986, p. 126). According to Rouhana, an apposite type of attachment exists with regard to the Palestinian nationality. This attachment fulfills the minority's sentimental needs for belonging and for achieving a national group identity, but it does not serve Palestinians' instrumental needs in the Israeli system. Using the civic (Israeli) and national (Palestinian) components of the minority's collective identity, Rouhana proposed a two-dimensional typology of various political parties in Israel based on their stated platforms for the 11th Knesset elections in 1984. According to this typology, support for the Labor Zionist Party among the Palestinian minority reflects an instrumental attachment to the civic identity component, coupled with an avoidance orientation toward the national identity component. In contrast, support for a Palestinian national movement is associated with a strong acceptance of the national identity component and an estrangement from the civic identity component.

Rouhana's theoretical analysis was confined to the voting preferences of Palestinian minority members. But the Jewish majority member's perception of the minority's collective identity may also be related to his or her voting preference. This argument is based on the reasonable assumption that a majority member's political outlook is influenced by, among other variables, his or her preferred mode for acculturating the Palestinian minority in the state of Israel.
As stated earlier, the main objective of the present study was to investigate Palestinian and Jewish Israelis' perceptions of the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. In addition, I was interested in testing the preceding detailed theoretical analysis regarding the relationship between a minority (or majority) member's voting preference and his or her relation to the civic and national components of the minority's collective identity. The general nature of the study was explorative. Nonetheless, I was interested particularly in addressing the following three research questions:

Research Question 1: How do members of the Palestinian minority, compared with members of the Jewish majority, perceive their collective minority identity?

Research Question 2: What are the appropriate models for describing the preceding two groups' perceptions of the minority's collective identity? In particular, which of the previously addressed models (bipolar, orthogonal, or politicization) is most appropriate to describe those perceptions?

Research Question 3: Do respondents with different political outlooks have different perceptions of the minority's collective identity?

I measured perceptions of the minority's collective identity by using a multi-dimensional scaling method (MDS; Young, Takane, & Lewyekyj, 1978). The eight identification labels used to construct the respondents' identity spaces were Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Arab–Palestinian, minority member, Israeli–Palestinian, Arab, Israeli, and Israeli–Arab. In addition, we used the label "I myself" for the Palestinian participants; to identify the minority for the Jewish participants, we used the label "an Arab resident of Israel living within the ‘Green Line’ boundaries."

Method

Respondents

The respondents were 283 Israeli students (153 Jewish and 130 Palestinian) at the University of Haifa, Israel. Their ages ranged from 20 to 30 years. Of the Jewish and Palestinian respondents, 63% and 72%, respectively, were women. Of the Jewish respondents, 58% were of Western origin, 18% of Eastern origin, and the remaining 22% reported a mixed origin. Of the Palestinian respondents, 57% were Muslims, 33% were Christians, and 7% were Druze.

Instruments

The questionnaire used in the study was written in Arabic for the Palestinian participants and in Hebrew for the Jewish participants. It was administered to Jewish participants by Jewish research assistants and to Palestinian participants by Palestinian research assistants. The complete questionnaire included two parts:

Proximity of identity labels. By using the students’ responses to 36 items, I constructed their perceived identity spaces by MDS (Young et al., 1978). For each
item, the respondent assessed the similarity between two identification labels (stimuli) on a 9-point scale. The items exhausted all possible paired comparisons between the eight identity labels mentioned earlier, in addition to "I myself" for the Palestinian respondents and "Arab resident of Israel living within the 'Green Line' boundaries" for the Jewish respondents. I used the responses of each participant to construct his or her proximity matrix; I then used the proximity matrices as input for the individual differences multidimensional scaling procedure (Takane, Young, & De Leeuw, 1977; Young et al., 1978) for the construction of the perceived identity spaces.

**Biographical information.** I collected biographical information about age, gender, country of origin, religion, voting behavior for the 13th Knesset, and study major at the university. The distributions of the Jewish and Palestinian respondents across age, gender, religion, and descent were detailed earlier. The distributions of voting behavior among the Jewish and Palestinian respondents are detailed in the Appendix.

**Results**

To construct the perceived identity spaces of the minority, I performed separate MDS analyses (Young et al., 1978) on the proximity matrices of the Palestinian and the Jewish respondents. The dimensions of the solutions were allowed to vary from 1 to 5. According to the results (not reported here), the one- and two-dimensional solutions yielded stress values that were significantly small ($p = .05$) in comparison with critical stress values (see Klahr, 1969). In selecting the solution dimensionality, I followed Kruskal's (1964) suggestion and chose a $D$-dimensional solution (provided that it was significant and interpretable) in cases where a significant $D + 1$ solution did not contribute to the interpretability of the solution. According to the comparison of the one- and two-dimensional solutions for the Palestinian and the Jewish respondents, the one-dimensional solutions had simple and clear interpretations, whereas the two-dimensional solutions were ambiguous and hard to interpret. Consequently, I have reported only the one-dimensional solution. The stress values for the Palestinian and Jewish respondents for the one-dimensional solution were 0.180 and 0.230, respectively (the critical stress for this solution is 0.267; see Klahr, 1969).

Table 1 contains the coordinates of the various identity labels in the 2 one-dimensional spaces for the Palestinian and the Jewish respondents, respectively. For brevity, I replaced the description "an Arab resident of Israel living within the 'Green Line' boundaries" in the right side of the table with "other."

I obtained the following results for the Palestinian respondents: (a) The civic (Israeli) identification and the national (Palestinian) identification labels were in opposition with one another, a result that lends strong support to the bipolar model. (b) The national (Palestinian) identity was more central than the civic
TABLE 1
Coordinates of the Various Identity Labels in the Unidimensional Spaces for the Palestinian and the Jewish Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Israeli</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>Arab-Israeli</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian in Israel</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I myself</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority member</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>Minority member</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>Palestinian in Israel</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>Minority member</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian–Arab</td>
<td>-2.14</td>
<td>Palestinian–Arab</td>
<td>-2.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Israeli) identity to their collective identity. The labels Israeli and Israeli–Arab were perceived as distant from the I myself identification, whereas the labels Palestinian and Arab were perceived as close to the I myself identification. (c) The Israeli–Palestinian label was fairly close to the I myself identification.

Taken together, the preceding findings indicate that the Palestinian respondents seemed to reject the civic (Israeli) identity as an appropriate description of their collective identity. In contrast, they related positively to their national (Palestinian) identity, as well as to the integrated Israeli–Palestinian identity.

The Jewish respondents' assessments of the Palestinian minority's identity space revealed (a) that they perceived the national and civic identities of the Palestinian minority as conflictual, again in accord with the bipolar model; and (b) that they perceived the integrated identities (Israeli–Palestinian and Israeli–Arab) as most appropriate to describe the minority's identity.

Perception of Collective Identity and Voting Behavior

I tested whether respondents with different political outlooks had different perceptions of the minority's collective identity. For the Palestinian and Jewish respondents, I constructed separate perceived identity spaces for subgroups of voters for different political parties. Given the distribution of Palestinian voters for the 13th Knesset (see Appendix), we constructed five separate identity spaces for the voters for Meretz, the Labor Party, the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), and the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE). Following is a brief description of the foregoing parties.1

1A detailed description of Israel's political parties can be found in the Knesset Web site (http://www.knesset.gov.il).
Meretz, the major opposition party with 10 Knesset members (KMs), is a democratic left-wing Zionist party. Its political platform includes support for the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel. The Labor Party is the largest Jewish–Zionist party in Israel (26 KMs), is currently part of the coalition, and is led by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The ADP is a small, socially conservative party. Founded by former KM Darawshe in 1988, the ADP attracted conservative Arab Muslims who had traditionally voted for the Labor Party and is currently part of the United Arab List, the largest Arab coalition in the 15th Knesset (represented by 5 KMs). The PLP, a political movement established in 1983 and dissolved in 1992, constituted a coalition between Jewish and Arab groups who had agreed on a common denominator (Miari, 1984). Most supporters of the PLP were Arabs. The Jewish members of PLP were mainly left-wing Zionists, whereas the Arab members were anti-Zionist nationalists. The DFPE is a coalition dominated by Rakah (the New Communist List party). At present, the DFPE is represented by 3 KMs. Formally, the DFPE (and the former PLP) are not Arab parties, but practically they can be considered as such, because the vast majority of their supporters are Arabs (for more details on the DFPE, PLP, and other Arab political parties and movements, see Rouhana, 1986). All five identity spaces (not reported) were one-dimensional. For the voters for each of the foregoing parties, Table 2 depicts the distances between I myself and the civic (Israeli) and national (Palestinian) identity labels.

According to comparisons of the distances between (a) I myself and the civic (Israeli) identity and (b) I myself and the national (Palestinian) identity, the former distance was more sensitive than the latter to differentiation between party voters. For all party voters, the perceived distance between I myself and Palestinian was relatively small, indicating that the Palestinian identity was perceived as important for self-definition by all party voters. In contrast, the distance between I myself and the Israeli identity changed significantly in accordance with the respondent’s party preference. Palestinian voters for the Labor

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Distance/identity</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Meretz</th>
<th>ADP</th>
<th>PLP</th>
<th>DFPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I myself/Israeli</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I myself/Palestinian</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. ADP = Arab Democratic Party. PLP = Progressive List for Peace. DFPE = Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.*
Party located their self-identity closer to the Israeli label than did Palestinian voters for Meretz and the ADP. The DFPE and PLP voters located their self-identity far from the Israeli identity.

I conducted a similar analysis for the Jewish sample. The distribution of this group justified our dropping from the analysis voters for the Moledet, Mafdal, and Shas parties. Moledet is an extreme right-wing Zionist party whose political platform calls for the expulsion of the Arab citizens from Israel. Founded in 1988 by Rechavam Ze'evi, a former IDF general, Moledet is now part of the National Union, an extreme right-wing party represented by 7 KMs. The Mafdal (the National Religious Party) is a Jewish right-wing party whose supporters are mainly religious traditionalists of Western origin (mainly descendants of immigrants from European countries). It is represented in the present (15th) Knesset by 5 KMs. Shas, now the third largest Israeli party (17 KMs), is a non-Zionist Jewish religious party. Supporters of Shas are mainly religious traditionalists of Eastern origin (i.e., descendants of immigrants from Arab and other Middle Eastern countries). The total number of participants who reported voting for Moledet, Mafdal, and Shas was negligible (2.8% of the Jewish sample).

I also grouped the voters of Tsomet and the Likud parties into one "right-wing" block. Tsomet is an extreme right-wing Zionist party, founded in 1988 by Rafael Ethan, a former IDF chief general. It is now part of the extreme right-wing National Union party. The Likud, currently led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, is the second largest party in the Knesset (represented by 19 MKs) and is the major right-wing party in Israel. The three separate identity spaces for Jewish voters for Meretz, the Labor party, and the right-wing parties were one-dimensional. Table 3 contains the distance between the labels Israeli, Palestinian, and other (representing the Palestinian minority) for the Jewish voters for Meretz, the Labor Party, and the right-wing parties.

According to the comparison of the distances for voters for Meretz, Labor, and the right-wing parties, the voters for the different parties had similar perceptions of the distance between the labels other and Israeli. In contrast, the perceived differences between the labels other and Palestinian emerged as appropriate indicators for differentiating between voters for the three parties. The voters for right-wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance/identity</th>
<th>Meretz</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Right wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other/Israeli</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Palestinian</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
parties perceived the identity of Arabs in Israel as close to the Palestinian identity component, whereas the Meretz supporters reported the greatest distance from this component. Those results suggest that the Jewish right-wing voters viewed the collective identity of Arabs in Israel as Palestinian, whereas the Meretz voters viewed the Arabs' collective identity as more Israeli than Palestinian.

Discussion

The present results indicated that both the Palestinian and the Jewish respondents perceived the national (Palestinian) and the civic (Israeli) labels as diametrically opposed. That result lends support to the linear (or bipolar) model (Tessler, 1977), which posits that the Palestinian (national) and the Israeli (civic) identities are conflictual, such that the accentuation of one identity entails the attenuation of the other. Consistent with previous findings (Rouhana, 1984, 1993; Smooha, 1988; Suleiman & Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Tessler, 1977), my results show that the Palestinian respondents, regardless of political preference, viewed their national identity as more central to their self-identification and distanced themselves from their civic identity.

The identity space of the Palestinian respondents revealed that they perceived the integrated Israeli-Palestinian label as fairly close to their self-identity. Taken alone, this finding might be interpreted as an indication that the Palestinian minority adopted an integrative acculturation strategy. Such interpretation could hardly be reconciled with the previously discussed results—namely, that the Palestinian minority members perceived their national and civic identities as diametrically opposed and rejected the latter as part of their collective identity. In fact, most relevant literature seems consensual in asserting the ethnic nature of Israel (Beit-Hallahmi, 1992; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Rouhana, 1997; Sa‘di, 1992; Smooha, 1990; Yiftachel, 1993) and the exclusivity of Israel’s ideology and policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian minority (Bishara, 1995; Rouhana, 1997; Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998; Suleiman, 1999). As a state that defines itself as the state of the Jewish people, Israel has always held a strong policy against assimilating or integrating the Palestinian minority. Moreover, Israeli policy has always been firm in rejecting autonomous status for the minority, thus blocking the option for a dissociated mode of acculturation (Sa‘di, 1992).

A plausible explanation for the seemingly contradictory results is that the Palestinian minority is undergoing a process of marginalization. Such an explanation is in line with the theoretical analysis of Al-Haj (1993), who suggested that the Palestinian minority constitutes a marginal group for the Jewish-Israeli society, as well as for the Palestinian society living outside the Green Line. The “double marginality” of this minority may have enabled its members to define their identity in national (Palestinian) terms, and—to some extent—in civic (Israeli) terms, without the need to commit themselves to either of the two referent groups. The double marginality may also have enabled them to tolerate the friction
between, and even to integrate, the two identities, despite the fact that they perceived them as contradictory and conflictual (Suleiman, 1999).

One can derive another possible explanation for the present results from the accentuated identity model (Rouhana, 1993). According to this model, the national (Palestinian) identity is the only identity internalized by the minority, whereas the civic (Israeli) identity is secondary and exists only in the formal and legal sense. The accentuated identity model postulates (a) that profound identification on the ideological, normative, and emotional levels is possible only with the Palestinian component and (b) that the relatedness to the Israeli component is superficial and instrumental. On the basis of this model, one might argue that the Palestinian respondents' use of the integrative (Israeli–Palestinian) label did not imply any tension, because they experienced the Israeli and Palestinian components on different levels and because the relatedness to the Israeli component was only superficial.

The perceptions of collective identity by Palestinian supporters of different political parties revealed that all respondents—regardless of political outlook—viewed the Palestinian identity as important for their self-definition. In contrast, Palestinian supporters of various parties differed in their relatedness to the Israeli identity. Specifically, the Palestinian supporters of Zionist parties (the Labor Party and Meretz) viewed the civic ( Israeli) identity as closer to their self-definition than did the supporters of Arab parties, who tended to exclude the civic component from the definition of their identity. Exceptional in this regard were the supporters of the ADP, who, in regard to the Israeli identity, were closest to the supporters of Meretz (Table 2). This result should not be surprising, because it lends empirical support to previous observations made by Ginat (1989), who argued that the ADP, led by Darawshe (a former Labor member), attracted supporters whose voting profile was similar to that of voters for Zionist parties.

Taken together, the present results lend only partial support to Rouhana's (1986) analysis regarding a person's political preference and his or her relatedness to the civic and national components of his or her identity. Supporting Rouhana's analysis, voters for Zionist and non-Zionist parties differed in their attachment to the civic identity. Nonetheless, contrary to Rouhana's analysis, voters for all parties (including Zionist ones) showed similar degrees of attachment to their national identity.

As stated before, the Jewish respondents perceived the Palestinian and Israeli components of the minority's identity as diametrically opposed. They also viewed the labels Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian as suitable for defining the minority's collective identity. Israeli Jews' use of the term Israeli–Arabs to define the minority is not new. This term was coined by Jewish "Arabists" and not by indigenous minority members. As noted by Sa'di (1992), its use was instrumental for a

2The term "Arabists" in Israeli political terminology is used to identify Jewish government advisors, and other officials, responsible for planning and implementing the State policy vis à vis the Palestinian minority.
divide et impera state policy intended to divide the Palestinian minority along religious and communal lines, while introducing a loose overarching identity to distinguish the Palestinian minority both from the Arabs in the Arab states and from the rest of the Palestinian people. In contrast, the use of the term Israeli–Palestinian is relatively recent and may reflect Israeli Jews' growing acceptance of terms that make explicit reference to the Palestinian component of the minority's collective identity. It is important to note that this acceptance does not necessarily imply the Jewish majority's legitimization of this component. Smooha (1992) argued that it is difficult to interpret Israeli Jews' use of the label Palestinian to define the minority. On the one hand, it may reflect recognition of the minority as a legitimate national group; on the other hand, it may reflect the delegitimization of this minority. The acknowledgment of the Palestinian component of the minority's identity came mainly from Jewish supporters of right-wing parties (Table 3). In contrast, supporters of Meretz, a Zionist left-wing party, did not consider the Palestinian component as part of the definition of the minority's identity. On the one hand, it seems fair to conclude that the inclusion of a Palestinian component by right-wing supporters was associated with a political outlook of delegitimization and exclusion of the minority. On the other hand, the left-wing supporters' exclusion of this component from the definition of the minority's identity is characteristic of the political outlook of left-wing Zionist parties, which constantly postulate their readiness to integrate minority members as individuals, but not as a collective with a separate, well-defined, collective identity. Obviously, these and other conclusions suggested by my results are to be considered with care until confirmed by further research. One might conjecture, for example, that national identity and national consciousness are more central for students and educated Palestinians than for others. I believe that a follow-up study is needed to test the validity and generalizability of the present results to other segments of both the Palestinian and Jewish populations. Research is also needed to directly tap the various acculturation strategies among different subgroups of the majority and minority.

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APPENDIX

Parties and Distributions of Voters for Political Parties in 13th Israeli Parliament (Knesset)

**Jewish Voters**
- Meretz 34%
- Labor 32%
- Likud 8%
- Others/abstained 6%

**Palestinian Voters**
- Meretz 27%
- Labor 13%
- Likud 3%
- Democratic Front for Peace and Equality 19%
- Progressive List for Peace 12%
- Arab Democratic Party 18%
- Others/abstained 8%

*Note.* Ten Jewish and 18 Palestinian respondents did not report their voting behavior.

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